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Abstract 
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the HRS cohort (age 51-56 in 1992). We find that the Boomers have accumulated more wealth than the 
previous cohort but they benefited from a large increase in house prices, which lifted the wealth of many 
home-owners. In fact, many EBB families, particularly those headed by respondents with low education, 
low income, and minorities, who have less wealth than the previous cohort. Lack of wealth can be traced 
to lack of retirement planning. Notwithstanding the many initiatives aimed at fostering planning in the 
1990s, a large portion of EBB still do not plan for retirement even though most respondents are close to it. 
The effect of planning is remarkably similar between the two cohorts; those who do not plan accumulate 
much lower amounts of wealth, from 20 to 45 percent depending on the location in the wealth 
distribution, than those who do plan. Thus, for both the EBB and the HRS cohort, lack of planning is 
tantamount to lack of saving irrespective of the many changes in the economy between 1992 and 2004. 
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Chapter 13
Saving between Cohorts: The Role
of Planning
Annamaria Lusardi and Jason Beeler
Employers have increasingly shifted from defined benefit (DB) to defined
contribution (DC) pensions in many nations, and particularly in the
United States. In DC plans, workers must select not only their contri-
bution levels, but also the allocation of their retirement portfolios. To
facilitate these decisions, employers and the government have worked
to foster retirement savings and improve financial literacy via retire-
ment seminars and other financial preparedness efforts. At the same
time, the financial industry has worked to produce products and tools
aimed at improving workers’ capacity to undertake retirement planning.
Whether these have had any impact on saving is the subject of this
chapter.
We address the issue by comparing the saving behavior of two genera-
tions: the Early Baby Boomers (EBBs), who were aged 51–56-year old in
2004, and an earlier cohort (hereafter, the original HRS cohort), who were
aged 51–56-year old a dozen years before, in 1992. By examining individuals
of the same age but born in different years, we can assess how being
exposed to different economic circumstances affects saving patterns.1 We
find that most EBBs have accumulated more wealth than the previous gen-
eration, but most of this is attributable to appreciation in housing equity. By
contrast, measures of nonhousing wealth show little or no change between
cohorts. There is also a sizable group of Early Boomers who have less wealth
than the HRS cohort; these families are disproportionately those with low
educational attainment or minorities. For both cohorts, low wealth may be
traced to lack of retirement planning, which translates into low saving rates.
At the median, nonplanners hold 20 percent less wealth than planners, but
figures are much higher (closer to 45%) for households at lower levels of
the wealth distribution.
This chapter proceeds by comparing personal and income characteristics
between the earlier and later cohorts. Next, we examine levels and compo-
sition of household wealth. We show that wealth is higher for those who
plan, but many Boomers have not planned for retirement.
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Empirical Approach
This chapter relies on data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS),
comparing the ‘Early Boomer’ cohort where at least one household mem-
ber was aged 51–56 in 2004, and the ‘original HRS’ cohort who were aged
51–56 in 1992.2 By comparing cohorts of the same age but in different
time periods (2004 vs. 1992), we can assess how being born in a different
time and having lived in different economic conditions affects financial
behavior.3
The Early Boomers are particularly important to study as they represent
the leading edge of a large generation on the brink of retirement. To carry
out the comparison between this cohort and its predecessor, we construct
from the surveys variables that are comparable across years. Specifically,
the measure of total net worth includes cash, checking, savings, mutual
funds and brokerage accounts, bonds, stocks, IRAs, net housing equity,
other real estate, net value of own businesses, cars and other vehicles minus
debts.4 Total household income is the sum of labor and capital income,
government transfer program income, and other income (gifts, lottery,
and so on). All values are expressed in $2004 and statistics are weighted.5
Questions about wealth and income are asked to the most knowledgeable
member in the HRS household regarding financial matters; this individual
is termed as the financial respondent hereafter.
Comparing the demographic composition of the two cohorts, many have
noted that Early Boomers have greater educational attainment than the
HRS cohort; not only are they more likely to have a college degree or
more than college education, but also they are less likely to be high-school
dropouts. Boomers are also less likely to be married and more likely to
have experienced a family breakup, so the fraction of families with children
decreased over the time period (cf. Iams et al., this volume; Manchester
et al., Chapter 6, this volume; Wolfe et al., Chapter 3, this volume). The
proportion of Hispanic households rose from 1992 to 2004 while the
proportion of Whites declined.6 Because wealth varies substantially across
demographic groups and it is strongly affected by education, marital status,
and race, it is important to keep these changes into account when examin-
ing household wealth holdings (see also Appendix Table 13A-1).
Of key interest is a comparison of the distribution of total household
income between the EBB and the HRS cohort (Table 13-1). Both mean
and median income for Early Boomers was higher than for the original
HRS respondents; to the extent that more household income is a proxy for
higher permanent income, we would expect EBB wealth to have increased
as well. Note, however, that below-median Boomer households had less
income than their counterparts in the HRS cohort, perhaps as a result
of the stagnation in wages for workers without a college degree during
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Table 13-1 Distribution of Total Household Income
for Original HRS (1992) and Early
Boomer (2004) Respondents
Percentile Original HRS Early Boomers
5th 9,129 6,984
10th 15,484 12,000
25th 31,957 30,000
50th 59,242 62,000
75th 93,272 100,480
90th 137,737 175,000
95th 175,032 238,000
Mean 73,592 85,931
SD 76,610 109,144
N 4,577 2,631
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Respondents/spouses aged 51–56; all figures weighted
using household weights ($2004).
the 1990s (Autor and Katz 1999; Autor et al. 2006). The households at
the bottom of the income distribution are also disproportionately those
with low education, unmarried, and Blacks and Hispanics, it might be
anticipated that those groups would face increasing difficulty accumulating
wealth over time.
The distribution of total net worth and nonhousing wealth is displayed
in Table 13-2. For both groups, the distribution of total net worth is quite
dispersed: that is, there are large differences in wealth even within this
narrow age band. Also, for both the mean and upper quartiles, Boomers
have indeed accumulated more wealth than their earlier counterparts, and
the differences are statistically significant. On the other hand, it would
appear that Boomers in the lower quartile of the wealth distribution accu-
mulated less wealth than the earlier cohort (differences are not statistically
significant). Lowest quartile households are also more likely to be in debt,
for the more recent group.
One big difference for the EBBs is that they experienced a large run-
up in housing prices, particularly during 2002 and 2003. Consequently
Panel B in Table 13-2 explores the possibility that improvements in EBB
wealth could be the result of the appreciation in home equity. In fact,
we see that most households hold little beside housing wealth, for both
generations. Also when we subtract housing equity from total net worth,
we confirm that EBB respondents at the bottom of the wealth distribution
and all the way up to the median hold lower nonhousing wealth than the
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Table 13-2 Comparing Wealth Distributions for
Original HRS (1992) and Early
Boomer (2004) Respondents
Percentile Original HRS ($) EBB ($)
A. Total net worth
5th 0 −3,500
10th 1,346 200
25th 40,769 36,500
50th 136,256 153,200
75th 315,058 403,000
90th 700,128 891,700
95th 1,218,493 1,332,000
Mean 327,715 391,959
SD 738,164 969,128
N 4,577 2,631
B. Total nonhousing net worth
5th −1481 −7,800
10th 0 0
25th 9,425 8,090
50th 54,799 53,000
75th 188,496 224,400
90th 527,789 609,000
95th 962,676 1,000,870
Mean 239,145 264,526
SD 687,774 849,317
N 4,577 2,631
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Respondents/spouses aged 51–56; all figures
weighted using household weights ($2004).
precursor generation. As a result, much of the rise in EBB wealth can
be attributed to housing equity and the result is statistically significant.
There are no significant differences in mean nonhousing wealth between
cohorts.
The distribution of total net worth in the population hides some impor-
tant differences across demographic groups highlighted in Table 13-3.
Here the least educated Boomers, along with Blacks, are found to have
much less wealth than the original HRS cohort. Only EBB households with
a college degree (or higher degrees) have higher wealth than HRS cohort
with the same educational attainment. Thus there are many differences in
the pattern of wealth, even after controlling for both age and economic
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Table 13-3 Distribution of Total Net Worth by Demographic Factors for
Original HRS (1992) and Early Boomer (2004) Respondents
Original HRS (1992) Cohort Early Baby Boomer (2004) Cohort
25th% Median 75th% 25th% Median 75th%
Education
< HS 1,346 41,065 118,214 200 22,500 80,000
HS grad 39,719 121,176 256,489 15,500 92,035 243,000
Some coll. 67,051 166,954 352,084 36,500 133,000 326,000
Coll. grad 117,137 257,163 556,467 140,000 302,000 690,000
> College 149,451 291,361 706,860 171,000 365,800 847,500
Race/ethnicity
White 60,588 166,550 368,241 64,000 199,000 464,000
Black 337 36,487 115,117 3 25,000 118,500
Hispanic 2,693 46,047 126,562 5,000 55,800 200,000
Marital status
Married 72,840 173,686 376,319 85,300 223,000 498,000
Not married 2,558 51,836 172,339 3,000 53,500 200,000
Sex
Male 58,568 166,954 368,943 55,960 196,000 490,000
Female 20,869 102,326 250,431 19,800 104,600 297,500
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Respondents/spouses aged 51–56; all figures weighted using household weights
($2004). Number of observations is 4,577 for the 1992 HRS cohort and 2,631 for the 2004
EBB.
status. Below we show how low wealth can be traced to lack of retirement
planning.
We turn now to a comparison of the composition of wealth between
these two generations, as illustrated in Table 13-4 and Figure 13-1. This
is important in view of the large changes in both the stock and housing
market during the 1990s, which could have influenced the wealth of EBB.
Clearly, one of the most important assets held by both generations is their
housing. Not only did home-ownership increase slightly between the two
generations (differences are significant at the 10% level of significance),
but also home equity accounts for one-third of total net worth among the
EBB. The amount of wealth accounted for by total real estate is close to
50 percent for EBB, while it was 44 percent for the HRS cohort. Thus,
exposure to the housing market has increased for the EBB compared to
the HRS cohort.
Two other important assets in the portfolios of both EBB and the HRS
cohort are stocks and IRAs or Keoghs. Figure 13-2 shows that ownership of
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Table 13-4 Asset Ownership and Percentage of Wealth Accounted for by Each
Asset for Original HRS (1992) and Early Boomer (2004)
Respondents
Checking Stock IRA Home Real Business
Account Owner Owner Owner Estate Owner
Owns that asset (%)
Orig. HRS 82.8 30.6 40.6 78.6 24.8 19.0
EBB 86.9 31.0 41.6 80.3 17.5 14.8
t-stat. of diff. 4.79 0.42 0.90 1.73 −7.52 −4.70
(p-Value) (0.00) (0.67) (0.37) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00)
Proportion of total net worth (%)
Orig. HRS 5.6 8.3 7.5 27.0 16.8 16.7
EBB 5.1 12.6 10.6 32.5 14.1 10.3
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The top panel indicates the probability of ownership of each asset in the 1992 HRS
cohort (N = 4,577) and the EBB (N = 2,631). The bottom panel reports the proportion of
total net worth accounted for by the assets listed in the first row. All figures are weighted
using household weights.
these assets increases slightly between the two cohorts (but the differences
are not statistically significant). Most households do not hold large amounts
of wealth in stocks and IRAs; the share of wealth accounted for by stocks
is 13 and 8 percent among EBB and the HRS cohort, respectively. The
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Figure 13-1. Ownership of homes and other real estate for original HRS and Early
Boomer Respondents. (Source: Authors’ calculations.)
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Figure 13-2. Ownership of stocks and IRAs in 1992 and 2004 across the distribution
of assets. (Source: Authors’ calculations.)
share of IRAs or Keoghs is similar but slightly lower in both years. On
the assumption that all IRAs were invested in the stock market, more than
23 percent of EBB’s wealth would be held in stocks; using similar measures,
a lower portion of the HRS cohort’s wealth, 156 percent, could have been
invested in the stock market. In other words, not only are Early Boomers
more concentrated in housing, but also exposure to the stock market has
increased compared to the HRS.7
In both cohorts, then, a large percentage of households in the lower
deciles of the wealth distribution own a home, but stock ownership is high
only near the top of the wealth distribution. What this means is that home
prices can play a major role in explaining changes in the distribution of
wealth between generations. For instance, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006b)
show that, if home prices by region in 2004 returned to their 2002 levels,
which would entail a cut of about 13 percent on average, Boomers would
lose approximately 9 percent of total wealth. A similar percentage change
in stock prices would have a much smaller impact on Boomer wealth, of
only 2 percent (Gustman and Steinmeier 2002). In other words, while
Boomers benefited from a remarkable increase in home prices lifting their
wealth with respect to the previous generation, they remain vulnerable to
housing fluctuations.8
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Explaining Differences in Wealth Holdings: The
Role of Planning
Thus far, we have shown substantial wealth dispersion for both Early
Boomers and their HRS precursors, and these wealth patterns persist even
for specific demographic groups. Next we ask whether initiatives seeking to
foster savings—such as retirement seminars—seem to have any impact on
household saving patterns. This question was broached by Lusardi (1999)
who pointed out that many households do not plan for retirement, even
when they are only a few years from this momentous event. Other studies
have confirmed her findings (cf. Yakoboski and Dikemper 1997; Ameriks
et al. 2003). And furthermore, Lusardi (1999, 2002, 2003) has demon-
strated that planning is a powerful determinant of wealth. Specifically, those
who report that they do not plan, arrive at retirement with much lower
amounts of wealth than those who do.
These issues can be addressed using responses to questions posed in
the HRS about retirement planning,9 comparing self-reported planning
efforts across cohorts. We can then link these answers to household wealth.
Table 13-5 reports the extent to which people in the two cohorts indicate
they have planned for retirement, and the associated levels of wealth they
have. We see, first, the proportion of nonplanners (those who have thought
about retirement ‘hardly at all’) fell among Early Boomers, as compared to
the original HRS, and this change is statistically significant. Nonetheless,
a large fraction of EBB (28 percent) still has not given much thought to
Table 13-5 Planning and Total Net Worth for Original HRS (1992) and Early
Boomer (2004) Respondents ($2004)
Group Sample 25th Median 75th Mean
% Percentile ($) ($) Percentile ($) ($)
A. Original HRS response to planning question
Hardly at all 32.0 10,098 76,906 200,613 224,311
A little 14.3 37,699 126,562 290,149 343,145
Some 24.8 72,032 173,753 367,298 340,681
A lot 28.9 71,393 173,686 356,796 353,523
B. EBB respondents response to planning question
Hardly at all 27.5 9,100 80,000 271,000 315,644
A little 17.0 63,500 173,400 392,000 364,464
Some 27.9 53,000 189,000 447,200 366,074
A lot 27.6 54,000 201,700 470,900 513,211
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Percentages of respondent in each planning group are conditional on being asked the
planning question. Respondents/spouses aged 51–56; all figures weighted using household
weights ($2004).
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retirement; even respondents are rapidly nearing this life change. Second,
we note that planning appears to be strongly and positively correlated with
wealth holdings: that is, those who plan accumulate much larger amounts
of wealth than nonplanners. Overall planners have accumulated up to
seven times the amount of wealth of nonplanners. The median planner
holds double the amount of wealth than the nonplanner, and differences
are even larger at the first quartile of the wealth distribution. Evidently
for many, lack of planning is tantamount to lack of saving. Note, however,
that there is not much difference in mean net worth between planning
categories. This is because there are several extremely wealthy households
who have not given any thought to retirement. Later we examine the impact
of these households on estimates of the effect of planning. Finally, the
planning effect appears strikingly similar, if we compare the two cohorts.
In other words, the relationship between planning and wealth does not
seem to have been much influenced by changes in home prices, changes in
stock prices, or increases in financial education during the 1990s.
Which households are more likely to be planners? Figure 13-3 reports
the proportion of planner types across education, sex, race, and cohort.
The large majority of those with less than a high-school education are
nonplanners. This is the case not only in the HRS cohort but also among
EBB. The proportion of nonplanners decreases at higher education
levels, but the share of nonplanners across education groups is very
similar between the two cohorts. This means that planning is strongly
linked to more education, although there is also a sizable fraction
of nonplanners among those with college and higher degrees. Since
educational attainment has increased during the 1990s, this may explain
why the fraction of nonplanners has decreased in the same time period.
Similarly, while financial education programs have been undertaken
during the 1990s, many low income and minority workers were not
exposed to such programs (Lusardi 2004). This may explain why lack of
planning tends to persist among these groups over time.
The figure also confirms that planning is also strongly correlated with
race/ethnicity: nonplanners are disproportionately concentrated among
Blacks and Hispanics. But it is encouraging to see that the proportion of
nonplanners among Blacks and Hispanics falls for the later cohort. There
are also differences in planning between women and men; women are
more likely to be nonplanners in both years. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006a,
20006b) further show that planning is strongly correlated with financial
literacy; those who can do simple calculations and understand the working
of inflation, interest compounding, and risk diversification, are also more
likely to plan.
Do the large differences in wealth across planning type persist when we
account for demographic characteristics and income? Has the effect of
planning changed over time? To address these questions, we next turn to
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a multivariate analysis of the effects of planning on wealth.10 We perform
regressions for each cohort and in the pooled sample, where we combine
the data between years.11 The analysis is structured as follows: we first con-
struct a simple indicator variable indicating ‘lack of planning’ (called No
planning), which takes the value 1 when households report they have given
‘hardly any thought’ to retirement. The models also control for other deter-
minants of wealth including age (and age squared), number of children,
marital status, education, sex, race/ethnicity, and whether the financial
respondent is partially or fully retired. In addition, we include total house-
hold income.12 Together with race and education, income serves as a proxy
for permanent income, that is, lifetime income. Because the distribution of
wealth is skewed to the right, we perform quartile regressions rather than
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions.
Empirical estimates appear in Table 13-6, where the coefficient on lack
of planning is always negative and statistically significant—for each of the
three wealth quartiles and in the pooled sample. Estimates are not only
sizable but also very similar between cohorts (in the pooled sample, the
interaction term between no planning and the 2004 year dummy is mostly
not statistically significant). Evidently, lack of planning sharply reduces
wealth, even after accounting for demographic characteristics and income.
Looking at medians, nonplanners accumulate from $17,000 to $20,000 less
wealth than those who do some (a little/a lot) planning, about 20 percent
less wealth. Our findings are therefore consistent with previous studies
which also show that lack of planning has an effect on wealth (Lusardi 1999,
2003; Ameriks et al. 2003). They are also consistent with other analysis of
the 2004 HRS using different measures of planning (Lusardi and Mitchell
2006a).
Other variables in Table 13-6 also have signs consistent with expectations.
For example, education and wealth are positively associated, and in partic-
ular, in 2004, wealth is concentrated among those with college or higher
degrees. Blacks and Hispanics accumulate less wealth than Whites, but the
effect is particularly pronounced among Blacks. Family breakups such as
divorce and separation are also detrimental to wealth accumulation. The
effect of divorce in both the median and third quartile estimates is much
larger among the EBB than the previous generation. Having more children
also leads to lower wealth holdings.
We also examine a different measure of wealth in Table 13-7, namely
total nonhousing wealth.13 Lack of planning continues to be statistically
significant and negative both across years and in the pooled sample.
In other words, planning affects other components of wealth beyond
housing equity. This result is to be expected, as the effect of planning is
similar between cohorts while housing equity increased substantially before
2004.
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Table 13-7 Median Regression of Nonhousing Wealth on Planning for Original
HRS (1992) and Early Boomer (2004) Respondents ($2004)
Orig. HRS EBB Pooled Sample
No planning −9.904 (3.046)∗∗∗ −9.709 (3.809)∗∗ −4.320 (2.437)∗
Year 2004 9.903 (2.197)∗∗∗
No plan Year 2004∗ −7.546 (3.912)∗
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.09 0.13
∗ Significant at 10%; ∗∗ Significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ Significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: This table reports median regressions of nonhousing net worth on planning and
other determinants of wealth. Nonhousing wealth is divided by 1,000; all monetary values
in $2004. Regressions include all the same explanatory variables as in Table 13.6. The total
number of observations is 3,727 in 1992 and 2,156 in 2004. Business owners and the top
and bottom 1% of the wealth distribution are excluded. Standard errors in parentheses.
Interpreting the Effect of Planning
The previous estimates show that the effect of planning on wealth is sizable.
How do we interpret the effect of lack of planning on wealth? To better
understand this effect, Table 13-8 reports median and OLS estimates of
lack of planning on net worth. For brevity, only pooled sample results are
reported and only for the key variables of interest. It is very interesting that
the OLS estimates of lack of planning are barely significant, indicating that
the choice of estimation technique is critical to assess the effect of planning
and, most importantly, that at high levels of wealth, planning may cease to
matter.
Table 13-8 OLS and Median Regressions of Net Worth on Planning in Pooled
Sample ($2004)
OLS Median
No planning −5.054 (16.362) −11.334 (5.959)∗
Year 2004 61.832 (11.080)∗∗∗ 13.864 (5.358)∗∗∗
No plan year 2004∗ −29.273 (20.472) −16.019 (9.578)∗
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.15
∗ Significant at 10%; ∗∗ Significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ Significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: This table reports OLS and median regressions of total net worth on planning and
other determinants of wealth in the pooled sample. Net worth is divided by 1,000 and
monetary values reported in $2004. Regressions include all the same explanatory variables
as in Table 13-6. The total number of observations is 5,883. Business owners and the top
and bottom 1% of the wealth distribution in each year are excluded. Standard errors in
parentheses.
13 / Saving between Cohorts: The Role of Planning 285
To understand this finding further, Figure 13-4 provides a graphic of the
prevalence of nonplanning by wealth percentile; the figure reports both
the point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals. Note that, up to
the 80th percentile of the wealth distribution, estimates are negative; that
is, lack of planning leads to lower wealth; and the confidence intervals are
narrow enough to make the estimates statistically significant. The downside
range of outcomes becomes more negative as we move to higher values of
wealth: for households in the HRS cohort in the third decile of wealth, lack
of planning is associated with a 30 percent reduction in wealth, while lack
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Figure 13-4. Estimates of the effect of ‘not planning’ on net worth by percentile of
the wealth distribution. (Source: Authors’ calculations.)
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of planning in the sixth decile is associated with 13 percent lower wealth.
Estimates are even stronger for the EBB: lack of planning in the third decile
is linked to 45 percent less wealth holdings, while lack of planning in the
sixth decile is linked to 25 percent less wealth. The effect of lack of planning
reverses as we move close to the top of the wealth distribution. Among
EBB, as we move past the third quartile of wealth, the effect of lack of
planning first becomes insignificant and then positive rather than negative.
The same is true for the HRS cohort, even though the effect happens at
higher percentiles of the wealth distribution.14
Our next goal is to illustrate that planning actually has an identifiable
influence on wealth. In other words, we seek to go beyond correlation to
directional causation: if someone were to begin planning tomorrow, would
he end up with larger net worth because of it? The difficulty is that planning
is potentially endogenous, in which case wealth could also influence plan-
ning through reverse causality. One reason reverse causality is a concern
is that wealthy individuals may plan more because they have more to gain
from planning, driving the significance of the coefficient in the OLS and
quantile regressions. There may also be a positive link between planning
on wealth due to some unobserved factor such as discipline, impatience, or
cognitive ability, which is responsible for the observed correlation between
planning and wealth.15
For all of these reasons, we require a different estimation technique
to test for the causal relationship of interest. One way to account for
reverse causality is to use an instrumental variable technique, which poses
instruments for planning (Ameriks et al. 2003; Lusardi 2003). By contrast,
here we develop a test to examine directly whether reverse causality exists,
by instrumenting wealth. The instrument must first provide an exogenous
change in wealth, one outside the control of the individual and uncorre-
lated with his or her preferences. If this exogenous change in wealth is
uncorrelated with planning after accounting for all controls, then it allows
us to test for reverse causality. Specifically, we run a regression where the
dependent variable is lack of planning, and regressors include net worth
and all of the demographic variables considered before, including income.
Our estimates (Table 13-9) indicate only mild evidence of reverse causality:
specifically, the effect of wealth is negative—suggesting that higher wealth
tends to increase planning—but the estimate are not always statistically
significant (in 2004 they are only significant at the 10 percent level). Most
importantly, the estimates are economically small in the separate and the
pooled samples; an increase in wealth of $10,000 decreases the probability
of not planning 0.4–0.5 percentage points. Given that wealth estimates may
be affected by influential observations, we also used a cubic transformation
of wealth, but results are similar.16
We next undertake Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation, recognizing
that net worth is clearly an endogenous variable. The instrument which
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Table 13-9 OLS Regression of Planning on Total Net Worth ($2004)
Orig. HRS EBB Pooled Sample
Net worth −0.000054 (0.000027)∗∗ −0.000045 (0.000024)∗ −0.000043 (0.000016)∗∗∗
Year 2004 −0.016 (0.012)
High school −0.080 (0.020)∗∗∗ −0.117 (0.036)∗∗∗ −0.107 (0.019)∗∗∗
grad
Some college −0.114 (0.024)∗∗∗ −0.119 (0.036)∗∗∗ −0.123 (0.020)∗∗∗
College grad −0.117 (0.029)∗∗∗ −0.167 (0.041)∗∗∗ −0.158 (0.023)∗∗∗
More than −0.103 (0.032)∗∗∗ −0.134 (0.043)∗∗∗ −0.127 (0.025)∗∗∗
college
Hispanic 0.094 (0.026)∗∗∗ 0.023 (0.037) 0.058 (0.022)∗∗∗
Black 0.036 (0.023) 0.022 (0.029) 0.027 (0.018)
Divorced −0.010 (0.021) 0.051 (0.024)∗∗ 0.037 (0.015)∗∗
Separated 0.070 (0.039)∗ 0.053 (0.051) 0.069 (0.031)∗∗
Widowed 0.035 (0.031) 0.056 (0.043) 0.056 (0.025)∗∗
Never married 0.044 (0.036) 0.067 (0.039)∗ 0.064 (0.025)∗∗
Female 0.087 (0.016)∗∗∗ 0.004 (0.020) 0.038 (0.012)∗∗∗
Log of income −0.075 (0.010)∗∗∗ −0.009 (0.010) −0.026 (0.006)∗∗∗
R2 0.11 0.06 0.07
∗ Significant at 10%; ∗∗ Significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ Significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: This table reports OLS regressions of not planning on total net worth. Net worth is
divided by 1,000 and all monetary values are in $2004. Regressions include dummies for
retirement status (fully and partially retired), number of children, age, and age squared.
The total number of observations is 3,727 in 1992, 2,156 in 2004, and 5,883 in the pooled
sample. Business owners and the top and bottom 1% of the wealth distribution in each year
are excluded. Standard errors in parentheses.
we argue influences net worth but is unrelated to planning is the recent
regional change in house prices, a measure that should be strongly cor-
related with wealth because housing is a large component of total net
worth for both cohorts. We exploit variation by region and not at the
individual level, so these price changes are not likely to be correlated with
the individual propensity to plan except through the channel of net worth.
As mentioned before, the EBB enjoyed a sharp increase in home prices
both before and during 2004. However, there is wide variation in home
prices across regions in the United States. For example, while the Pacific
region experienced an increase of 10.3 percent in 2003, the southeast
region experienced an increase of 3.6 percent in 2003. The HRS cohort
had the opposite experience; during 1990 and 1991 the housing market
experienced a bust, which was particularly pronounced in specific regions
of the United States such as New England. We use the change in home
prices in the previous year (i.e. the changes between 2004 and 2003 for
EBB and the changes between 1992 and 1991 for the HRS cohort) across
regions as an instrument for wealth.17
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Table 13-10 First Stage Regressions of IV Estimation of Total Net Worth on
Housing Price Increases
Orig. HRS EBB Pooled Sample
Percentage increase −4.988 (2.121)∗∗ 16.757 (3.239)∗∗∗ 10.911 (1.885)∗∗∗
Year 2004 1.023 (13.363)
High school graduate 13.335 (12.481) −10.745 (30.827) −0.105 (14.806)
Some college 49.170 (14.651)∗∗∗ 1.236 (31.173) 14.734 (15.770)
College graduate 96.897 (17.986)∗∗∗ 168.292 (35.201)∗∗∗ 150.764 (18.320)∗∗∗
More than college 164.724 (19.304)∗∗∗ 242.018 (37.028)∗∗∗ 226.037 (19.454)∗∗∗
Hispanic −40.042 (16.332)∗∗ −68.629 (31.973)∗∗ −55.268 (17.069)∗∗∗
Black −75.006 (14.207)∗∗∗ −84.326 (25.246)∗∗∗ −81.589 (14.096)∗∗∗
Divorced −51.387 (13.185)∗∗∗ −63.436 (21.029)∗∗∗ −59.194 (12.149)∗∗∗
Separated −41.291 (23.928)∗ −34.927 (45.006) −32.472 (24.560)
Widowed −24.493 (18.949) 124.459 (37.443)∗∗∗ 64.629 (20.031)∗∗∗
Never married −60.063 (22.460)∗∗∗ −64.316 (33.540)∗ −61.223 (19.738)∗∗∗
Female 29.290 (9.745)∗∗∗ −39.638 (17.105)∗∗ −14.117 (9.579)
Log of income 83.800 (5.997)∗∗∗ 84.658 (8.322)∗∗∗ 86.004 (4.989)∗∗∗
R2 0.19 0.22 0.21
∗ Significant at 10%; ∗∗ Significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ Significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: This table reports OLS regressions of total net worth on the percentage increase in
housing prices by region in the previous year. Net worth is divided by 1,000 and all monetary
values are in $2004. Regressions include dummies for retirement status (fully and partially
retired), number of children, age, and age squared. The total number of observations is
3,727 in 1992, 2,156 in 2004, and 5,883 in the pooled sample. Business owners and the top
and bottom 1% of the wealth distribution in each year are excluded. Standard errors in
parentheses.
As the first-stage regressions reported in Table 13-10 show, changes in
regional prices are strong predictors of wealth. In particular, a 1 percent
increase in home prices increases wealth by more than $16,000among
EBB, while a 1 percent decrease in prices during the early 1990s increased
wealth by close to $5,000, perhaps a result of the fact that home prices
had decreased sharply before that period and, consequently, had already
depressed the value of wealth.18 In the pooled sample, the increase in
wealth following a change in home prices is also positive. The IV estimates
reported in Table 13-11 show that the effect of wealth, instrumented by
changes in home prices, on lack of planning is either not statistically signif-
icant or positive. In addition, in both 1992 and 2004, the positive IV esti-
mates are significantly different than the negative OLS point estimates; for
both cohorts, exogenous increases in wealth tend to reduce the propensity to
plan.19 What this suggests is that lack of planning is positively influenced by
wealth, so the OLS estimates are biased and represent an underestimate of
the effect of planning, compatible with what Lusardi (2003) finds. The IV
estimates of lack of planning on wealth are much larger than the OLS esti-
mates, a result also consistent with Ameriks et al. (2003) who use a different
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Table 13-11 Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation of ‘Not Planning’ on Net
Worth
Orig. HRS EBB Pooled Sample
OLS −0.000054 −0.000045 −0.000043
(0.000027)∗∗ (0.000024)∗ (0.000016)∗∗∗
IV 0.00287 0.000387 0.000135
(0.00142)∗∗ (0.00024) (0.000225)
Hausman test 13.283 2.951 0.279
(p-Value) (0.0003)∗∗∗ (0.085)∗ (0.597)
∗ Significant at 10%; ∗∗ Significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ Significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: This table reports IV regressions of not planning on total net worth. Net worth is
divided by 1,000 and all monetary values are in $2004. Regressions include all the same
explanatory variables as in Table 13-6. The total number of observations is 3,727 in 1992,
2,156 in 2004, and 5,883 in the pooled sample. Business owners and the top and bottom
1% of the wealth distribution in each year are excluded. Standard errors in parenthesis with
p-value in parentheses for Hausman test.
data-set and use propensity to plan for a vacation andmathematical abilities
as instruments for planning.
To summarize: Planning is an important determinant of wealth and an
important reason for why many families arrive close to retirement with
little or no wealth. Both the quantile estimates and the IV exercise show
that planning has a powerful effect on wealth. The IV estimation shows
that reverse causality is not driving the significant relationship between
wealth and lack of planning. In fact, reverse causality tends to result in an
underestimation of the effect of planning. Thus, the effect of planning is
even stronger than the OLS and quantile estimates report. Moreover and
most importantly, the effect of planning has remained unchanged between
years. Thus, while the increase in home prices has lifted the wealth of many
Early Boomers, lack of planning has the same effect between cohorts: it
sharply reduces wealth.
Discussion and Conclusion
As the Baby Boomers stand on the verge of retirement, along many dimen-
sions they appear better prepared than their precursor counterparts; for
instance, many have accumulated larger amounts of wealth in 2004. Yet
this is not the case for all cohort members, since Blacks and the least
educated accumulated less wealth than the previous generation. Moreover,
a larger proportion of Boomer wealth is exposed to fluctuations in asset
prices, particularly housing prices; accordingly a fall in housing values
could undermine their retirement preparedness.
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It is interesting that many Boomers have still not devoted much thought
to their retirement prospects, even when retirement is only a few years away.
Close to 30 percent of respondents gave no thought to retirement, which
leads to little saving. The effect of planning is found to be strong and posi-
tively associated with retirement wealth, and the impact is remarkably stable
across cohorts. Thus, nonplanners have not been much affected by the
changes in the economy between 1992 and 2004, including the financial
education initiatives undertaken during the 1990s. One reason is that they
have not devoted much energy to retirement planning, even though plan-
ning is a crucial determinant of household wealth. Specifically, those who
fail to plan have accumulated much less wealth than those who did some
planning, and this finding is strikingly similar across cohorts. Nonplanners
are disproportionately those with low education, low income, and
Blacks/Hispanics. These households were largely unaffected by financial
education programs instituted during the 1990s. In general, policies which
stimulate saving might be best targeted to those groups least likely to plan.
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Notes
1 By comparing two generations at different points in time, we cannot distinguish
between ‘time’ and ‘cohort’ effect. We will use the term cohort/time interchange-
ably. For more discussion, see Kapteyn et al. (2005).
2 We also delete a handful of observations with missing information about demo-
graphic variables such as age, sex, marital status, number of children, and race and
ethnicity; moreover, we also delete observations with zero income as they are likely
to be the result of measurement error. The final sample size for analysis is 2,631
EBBs and 4,577 in the HRS cohort.
3 Earlier studies on Boomers’ saving patterns are mixed; cf. Bernheim (1993) ver-
sus the Congressional Budget Office (1993). Research on the effects of retirement
seminars during the 1990s has also reported mixed results estimates (for a review,
see Lusardi 2004).
4 Our measure differs from total net nonpension wealth used in other papers in
this volume as it includes IRAs and Keoghs.
5 We use preliminary weights provided by the HRS for 2004 and the final weights
for 1992. In both 1992 and 2004, the HRS sample is not representative of the
population in that age group due to sample attrition.
6 Because race and ethnicity is not exclusive and Hispanics can also report being
White, Black, or Other Race, in addition to being Hispanic, the percentages in
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Table 13-1 sum to more than 100. However, the same definition is used in both
years.
7 We must also note that the analysis includes IRAs and Keoghs but excludes
company pensions and Social Security wealth. As Gustman and Steinmeier (1999)
show, pension and Social Security wealth can account for as much as half of total
wealth. Unfortunately, the HRS has not yet provided accurate measures of these
values for the EBB cohort. It is also worth noting that, as Cunningham et al.
(Chapter 10, this volume) showed, calculations of pension wealth are difficult to
compute very precisely.
8 Another asset that merits consideration is business equity. While business owners
account for a small fraction of the population, they account for a sizable amount
of total wealth (Gentry and Hubbard 2004; Hurst and Lusardi 2006). For example,
while close to 15 percent of EBB are business owners, wealth they hold in business
equity is as large as all the IRA wealth (even though 42% of Early Boomers hold
IRAs). In other words, Business owners are disproportionately located at the top of
the wealth distribution; Hurst and Lusardi (2006) show that over 80 percent of the
richest 3 percent of households are business owners. The percentage of business
owners has decreased between cohorts and so has the share of total wealth invested
in business equity. Unfortunately, we lack all the needed information to account for
differences between business owners and other households, so we exclude business
owners from further analysis.
9 For a detailed discussion of the findings in the module on planning and financial
literacy, see Lusardi and Mitchell (2006a).
10 As noted above, we delete business owners from the analysis since business own-
ers display different motives to save than other households (cf. Hurst and Lusardi
2004, 2006; Hurst et al. 2005). Moreover, there are several measurement issues
in assessing correctly their income, as they have a clear incentive to underreport
earnings. For a good discussion of this issue, see Hurst et al. (2005).
11 We trim the top and the bottom 1 percent of the wealth distribution to avoid
outliers in the empirical work.
12 To limit the effect of outliers, we take the log of income. This empirical spec-
ification is similar to the specification used in most saving studies (Lusardi 2002,
2003).
13 For brevity, we only report median rather than other quantile estimates, but
planning has an effect across the wealth distribution. For a discussion of the role
of housing wealth on retirement savings, see Venti and Wise (1990, 1991).
14 As there are some very high network households at the top of the wealth distrib-
ution, they become influential in the OLS estimates; researchers must take care in
assessing the empirical estimates of lack of planning on wealth.
15 However, it is also possible that extremely wealthy individuals plan less because
they do not need to plan in order to build wealth, biasing the coefficient in the
previous regressions toward 0.
16 We cannot take the log of wealth as many households have negative wealth
particularly in 2004; for a similar approach, see Haliassos and Bertaut (1995).
17 Hurst and Lusardi (2004) have used similar instruments for wealth to be able to
assess the effect of wealth on business start-ups.
18 We have also considered other time periods. For example, we consider price
changes in the previous two years and we consider price changes in a ten-year
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period. In both case, we find that price changes are good predictor of wealth. We
report the estimates of the one-year price change only because they are the strongest
predictor of wealth. The IV estimates in the other two cases are similar.
19 Given the importance of housing equity in the measure of total net worth,
these estimates may simply show that planning has an effect on housing wealth.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to find instruments that predict nonhousing wealth, so
we restrict the IV estimation to only one measure of household wealth.
Appendix
Table 13A-1 Demographic Characteristics of the Sample: Original
HRS and Early Boomers (EBB)
Cohort Orig. HRS EBB
Age
Average age 53.7 53.7
Education (%)
Less than high school 18.6 9.2
High school graduate 38.5 28.4
Some college 21.1 29.0
College graduate 11.4 18.2
More than college 10.4 15.2
Race/ethnicity (%)
White 85.9 80.8
Black 10.2 11.7
Hispanic 7.6 8.7
Other 2.9 7.5
Marital status (%)
Married 71.4 62.8
Divorced 14.8 21.6
Separated 3.4 3.3
Widowed 5.5 4.9
Never married 4.3 7.2
Children (% in sample)
No children 8.8 17.2
Have children 91.2 82.8
Sex (% in sample)
Male 55.7 54.4
Female 44.3 45.6
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Number of observations is 4,577 for the 1992 HRS cohort and 2,631 for
the 2004 EBB. At least respondent or spouse is 51–56-year old. All figures are
weighted using household weights.
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Table 13A-2 Percentage of Net Worth Accounted for by Not
Planning, by Wealth Decile ($2004)
Decile (%) Estimate Net Worth Percentage
A. Original HRS cohort
10th −5.90 0 NA
20th −11.94 6.92 172.57
30th −9.27 31 29.90
40th −10.77 60 17.95
50th −17.23 104 16.57
60th −20.92 161 13.00
70th −33.81 229.4 14.74
80th −55.61 357.61 15.55
90th −74.08 611.6 12.11
B. EBB cohort
10th −8.21 0 NA
20th −10.78 10.77 100.04
30th −15.83 35.01 45.22
40th −16.08 60.59 26.54
50th −20.03 92.90 21.56
60th −32.88 131.95 24.92
70th −40.17 181.44 22.14
80th −44.68 258.18 17.30
90th −33.12 420.08 7.88
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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